n98 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1996) ("Our review of the available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principles.") (footnote omitted).

n99 See id. See also, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) and discussion infra nn. 170-90 and accompanying text.

n100 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See also, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 126 F.3d. 25 (2d Cir. 1997) and discussion infra nn. 110-28 and accompanying text.

n101 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See also, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) and discussion infra nn. 303-25 and accompanying text.

n102 See discussion infra note 35.

n103 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998).

n104 See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W. 2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the defendant intended to advertise its wagering service to an American market).

n105 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (1997) (illustrating that in the cases finding jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on Internet advertisements or solicitations, "something more" is required to subject the advertiser to jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state).

n106 See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (U.S. Magistrate Peck declining to follow the holdings in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996); and Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)).

n107 Compare Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that "something more" than simply an Internet advertisement is required for personal jurisdiction), with Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (although the court declined to decide whether the web site alone would confer jurisdiction, it is clear from the analysis that it would).

n108 See Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (1997).

n109 See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d. 715, 720-721 (1997).

n110 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).

n111 See id. at 297.

n112 See id.

n113 See id.

n114 See id. King's web site did contain a disclaimer stating that it was not to be confused with the club's namesake in New York, and recommended that its web site viewers visit the New York club when in that city. See id. at 297. Bensusan's action also asserted claims for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition. See id. at 298.

n115 See generally id. at 299-301 (holding that the New York long-arm statutes did not confer jurisdiction over the defendant, and, even if it did, asserting jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause because the defendant had not purposefully availed himself of the benefits of New York).

n116 See id. at 299-300. Bensusan asserted jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. ß 302(a)(2) and (a)(3)(ii). Section 302(a)(2) allows jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who commits a "tortious act within the state" when the cause of action arises from the tortious act. Section 302(a)(3)(ii) allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for tortious acts committed outside the state that cause injury in the state if the non-resident "expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." Id. at 299.

n117 See id. at 299.

n118 See id.

n119 Id. at 299.

n120 Id.

n121 See id. at 300.

n122 See id.

n123 Id. at 301 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)).

n124 Id.

n125 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997).

n126 See id. at 27 ("Because we believe that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the instant case is proscribed by the law of New York, we do not address the issue of due process.").

n127 See id. at 29.

n128 See id.

n129 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).

n130 See id. at 415. Interestingly, the principals of Cybersell Arizona are Laurence Canter and Martha Siegal, known among web users as the first "spammers" of the Internet. Spamming refers to the posting of indiscriminate advertisements to newsgroups on USENET.

n131 Id.

n132 Id. at 416.

n133 Id.

n134 Id.

n135 Id. at 419.

n136 Id. at 418.

n137 Id.

n138 Id. at 419. The court found that Cybersell Florida didn't receive any money, telephone calls, e-mails, or hits on its site from Arizona. In addition, it didn't have an 800 number on its web site. See id.

n139 See id. at 420 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). In Calder v. Jones, the Court looked to whether the effects of out-of-state actions prevented a State "from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects." See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788.

n140 See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). This case is somewhat distinguishable because it reached its conclusion based entirely on the basis of the New York long-arm statute, much like the Bensusan cases, and did not even reach the minimum contacts analysis. In addition, this case was based on very unique facts. The defendant was operating a web site using the plaintiff's trademark as the domain name. But the defendant's web site advertised a service it would offer in the future. Based on these facts, the court fully admitted that it would have likely had jurisdiction if the plaintiff had filed suit after defendant had begun selling his services to New Yorkers. Id. at *11.

n141 See generally id. at *7-15

n142 See id. at *11. Defendant's web site advertised a litigation support business to be offered in the future. Id. at *10.

n143 1997 WL 574950 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1997).

n144 See id. at *1.

n145 See id. at *5.

n146 See id. at *6.

n147 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996).

n148 See id. at 1827.

n149 See id.

n150 See id.

n151 See id.

n152 See id. at 1828.

n153 The court found that defendant's contacts were not sufficiently "substantial, systematic or contiguous to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction." Id. at 1829.

n154 Id. at 1828.

n155 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).

n156 See id. at 418.

n157 Id.

n158 California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986).

n159 See id. at 1360-64.

n160 See id. at 1358. More specifically, California Software claimed intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, slander of title, libel, slander, civil conspiracy, unfair competition, and intentional interference with their right to pursue a lawful business as a result of two sets of communications made by defendants. Id.

n161 See id. at 1359-64.

n162 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

n163 See California Software, Inc., 631 F. Supp. at 1361.

n164 Id.

n165 Id. at 1361-62. One of the defendants placed a message on the CRF in response to inquiries made by prospective buyers of the plaintiff's software package. That message warned users of the plaintiff's software package about a potential software license dispute with the defendants. The message by the defendant warned that anyone who purchased the plaintiff's software package would be held financially liable for its misuse if the defendants ultimately prevailed in their suit. See id. at 1358-59 n.2.

n166 Id.

n167 Id. at 1363.

n168 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

n169 See California Software, Inc., 631 F. Supp. at 1363.

n170 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).

n171 See id. at 1259.

n172 See id. at 1261. Shareware is a type of software which is created by anyone, including CompuServe, and distributed free. Once a person downloads shareware, the end user is expected to pay the creator the suggested licensing fee if the user keeps and uses the software beyond the specified trial period. Id. at 1260. Defendant Patterson claimed that the terms "WinNav," "Windows Navigator," and "Flashpoint Windows Navigator" were all common law trademarks which he and his company owned. Id. At 1261.

n173 Id. at 1261.

n174 Id.

n175 Id. at 1260.

n176 Id. Under the SRA, CompuServe agreed to provide its subscribers with access to the software that the creator had written. The SRA purported to create an independent contractor relationship with the creator, in this case Patterson. The SRA did not mention the software by name, but rather left the content and the identification to Patterson. The SRA incorporated both a Service Agreement and a Rules of Operation. Both have a "choice of forum" clause expressly providing that the contract was entered into in Ohio, and the Service Agreement further provides a "choice of laws" clause which states that the contract is to "be governed and construed in accordance with" Ohio law. Id.

n177 See id. at 1261. Patterson claimed that he sold less than $ 650 worth of his software to only twelve Ohio residents. See id.

n178 See id. Patterson's software product was a program designed to help people navigate around the Internet. CompuServe began to market a similar product that Patterson took to be too similar to his own.

n179 See id.

n180 See id.

n181 Id. at 1269.

n182 See id. at 1262 (citation omitted).

n183 Id.

n184 Id.

n185 Id. at 1263.

n186 Id. at 1263-64 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).

n187 Id. at 1265 (citation omitted).

n188 Id.

n189 Id. at 1266.

n190 Id. at 1267-68. Yet, the court did explicitly note the limited precedential value of its holding. The court stated that it was not holding that Patterson could be subject to suit in any state where his software was purchased or used; or that Patterson could be subject to suit in Ohio from an injury by the software in a third state; or that CompuServe could sue any regular subscriber in Ohio. See id.

n191 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).

n192 See id. at 1318. Panavision accused Toeppen of being a "cyber pirate" who steals valuable trademarks and registers domain names on the Internet using these trademarks. The object of such a scheme was to sell the domain names to the rightful trademark owners for money. In this case, Toeppen offered to "settle the matter" if Panavision would pay him $ 13,000 in exchange for the domain name. See id. at 1319. The court found that Toeppen had registered other domain names for various other companies including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, and over 100 other marks. See id.

n193 See id. at 1320-21 (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997)).

n194 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (establishing an "effects test" for intentional action aimed at the forum state).

n195 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.

n196 See supra text accompanying notes 155-57. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).

n197 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321.

n198 Id. Although Panavision was incorporated in Delaware, its principal place of business was in California, at "the heart of the theatrical motion picture and television industry." Id. (citation omitted).

n199 See id. at 1322 & n.2.

n200 See id. at 1322. Toeppen claimed that all he had done was register Panavision's trademark as a domain name in Illinois and post a web site using that mark. Id.

n201 See id. In this case the court found that the "something more" was provided by the defendant's obvious attempt to extort money from the defendants using their name.

n202 See id. at 1322-24.

n203 Id.

n204 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

n205 See id. at 1121. Manufacturing filed a five-count complaint against Dot Com alleging trademark dilution, infringement, and false designation under the Federal Trademark Act as well as state trademark dilution. Id.

n206 See id.

n207 See id. Dot Com's employees, offices, and equipment are all located in California. Dot Com's advertising about its service occurs over its web site, which was accessible to Pennsylvania residents over the Internet. At the time of the trial, defendants had about 140,000 paying customers, of which 3,000 were Pennsylvania residents. To become a subscriber of Dot Com, customers needed to fill out a subscription form located on Dot Com's web site. Payment was made by credit card over the Internet or by telephone. Id.

n208 Id. The court noted specifically that Dot Com had entered into agreements with seven Internet Service Providers ("ISP's") in Pennsylvania to permit their subscribers to access Dot Com's news service. Two of these providers were located in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Id.

n209 Id. at 1127.

n210 Id. at 1126.

n211 Id.

n212 Id.

n213 Id. (quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).

n214 Id. The court provided here an excellent example of what a fortuitous contact in the context of World Wide Volkswagen might look like. Dot Com's contacts with Pennsylvania would be fortuitous "if it had no Pennsylvania subscribers and an Ohio subscriber forwarded a copy of a file he obtained from Dot Com to a friend in Pennsylvania or an Ohio subscriber brought his computer along on a trip to Pennsylvania and used it to access Dot Com's service. That is not the situation here." Id.

n215 Id.

n216 See id. at 1124. This is the same classification system determined to be misleading. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105.

n217 See id. at 1125. See supra text accompanying notes 170-90.

n218 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).

n219 Id. at 2.

n220 Id.

n221 Id.

n222 See id. at 2.

n223 Id. at 3.

n224 Id.

n225 Id. at 5.

n226 See id. at 3.

n227 See id. at 3-4. The advertisement invited readers to "Help Donate $ 100,000 to Boomer Esiason's Heroes Foundation and Find a Cure for Cystic Fibrosis." Id. at 3. The advertisement displayed a photograph of Boomer Esiason, a quarterback for the National Football League at the time, and his son who suffers from cystic fibrosis. Attached to the advertisement, which appeared in the insert in the newspaper's Sunday edition, were coupons for several Proctor & Gamble products. The advertisement explained that Proctor & Gamble would donate up to $ 100 to the Heroes Foundation for each redeemed coupon. It also gave a toll-free telephone number for Foundation. See id.

n228 Id. at 3.

n229 See id. Distinguishing this case from the others that Foundation cited, the court found that this case involved an advertisement "placed specifically in the forum's local newspaper, not in a national newspaper or a trade publication which happened to circulate there." Id.

n230 See id. at 4-5.

n231 Id. at 4.

n232 Id. at 4. The home page contained the trademarked name, logo, and a toll free telephone number for soliciting contributions. Id. at 5.

n233 Id. at 5.

n234 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).

n235 See Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164-65).

n236 See id. at 5.

n237 American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 6823 (LLS), 1997 WL 466507 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1997).

n238 Id. at *1.

n239 Id.

n240 See id. at *7.

n241 See id.

n242 See id. at *3.

n243 See id. at *1.

n244 See id. at *1.

n245 See id. at *2.

n246 Id. at *3.

n247 Id. at *4.

n248 Id. at *4.

n249 See id. at *2.

n250 See id.

n251 See id. at *4-5.

n252 See id. at *5.

n253 See id.

n254 See id.

n255 Id.

n256 Id.

n257 See id. at *6-7.

n258 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

n259 American Network, 1997 WL 466507, at *8.

n260 See id. at *8.

n261 See id.

n262 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).

n263 See id. at 46-47.

n264 See id. at 47. Drudge's base of operations has been an office in Los Angeles, California. The Drudge Report is available on the Internet at <http:// www.drudgereport.com>.

n265 See id. at 47. At the web site, Drudge has a hyperlink link that caused the most recently published addition to be displayed when activated. Drudge had also developed a list of regular e-mail subscribers to whom he e-mailed each new addition of the Drudge Report. By March 1995, Drudge had 1,000 regular e-mail subscribers. Plaintiffs alleged that by 1997, Drudge had 85,000 subscribers to his e-mail service.

n266 See id. America Online (or "AOL") claims more than nine million subscribers. According to the written license agreement between Drudge and AOL, Drudge would receive a flat monthly royalty payment and Drudge managed the content of his column. Drudge would then e-mail each new edition of the column to AOL, which would then post the new edition on its service.

n267 See id. Drudge transmitted the report from Los Angeles, California by e-mail to his direct subscribers and by posting both a headline and the full text to his web site. He then transmitted the text, but not the headline, to AOL which then made it available to its subscribers.

n268 See id. at 48. Drudge retracted the story through a special edition of the Drudge Report posted on his web site and e-mailed to his subscribers on August 11, 1997. Drudge e-mailed the retraction to AOL on August 12, 1997 which then posted the column to its service. Drudge later publicly apologized to the Blumenthals.

n269 See id. at 53. The Blumenthals relied on the long-arm statute which conferred jurisdiction over an entity causing tortious injury inside the District by an act or omission outside the District. D.C. Code 13-423(a)(4). Drudge conceded that the allegedly defamatory edition of the Drudge Report was published outside the District and that the tortious injury was caused within the District. Thus, the only question before the court was whether Drudge regularly conducted business, derived substantial revenue, or engaged in a persistent course of conduct in the District of Columbia as defined under the D.C. Code. Id. at 53-54.

n270 See id. at 57-58. The Court found that the exercise of jurisdiction was permissible under the D.C. long-arm statute. Because the long-arm statute didn't reach the outer limits of due process and that sufficient "plus factors" were met, the Court concluded that there was also sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process. In its analysis, the court applied the "plus factors" noted in Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court noted that these "plus factors" do not themselves confer jurisdiction, but rather the court relies on them to "filter out cases in which the inforum impact is an isolated event and the defendant otherwise has no, or scant, affiliation with the forum." Id. at 54 (quoting Crane, 814 F.2d at 763).

n271 See id. at 54.

n272 See id.

n273 See id. at 55; see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (comparing Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (exercise of jurisdiction warranted where defendant's interactive web site encouraged browsers to add their address to mailing lists that subscribed users to the service) with Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299-300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (passive web site which only posted information for interested persons who may have accessed the web site not sufficient for exercise of jurisdiction)).

n274 See id. at 54.

n275 See id. at 57.

n276 Id. at 57.

n277 See id.

n278 See id.

n279 See id.

n280 See id.

n281 See Heroes, 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the web page with the offending trademark and logo was "certainly a sustained contact with the District." Id. at 5.).

n282 See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that the defendant had a web site that was accessible in the District; that the defendant had visited the District twice; that the defendant solicited money from individuals within the District; that the defendant's column was sent to e-mail addresses in the district; and that the defendant regularly contacted individuals by telephone, mail, and e-mail for the news that filled his column).

n283 See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (U.S. Magistrate Peck declining to follow the holdings in Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996); and Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).

n284 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).

n285 See id. at 162-163.

n286 See id.

n287 See id. at 162.

n288 See id. at 164.

n289 See id.

n290 See id.

n291 See id.

n292 See id. (quoting McFaddin v. National Executive Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (D. Conn. 1973)).

n293 Id.

n294 See id.

n295 See id. (citing Whelen Engineering Co. v. Tomar Electrics, 672 F. Supp. 659 (D. Conn. 1987).

n296 See id. at 165.

n297 See id.

n298 See id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).

n299 See id.

n300 947 F. Supp. 1328 (1996).

n301 See id. at 1329

n302 See id. at 1330.

n303 See id.

n304 See id.

n305 See id. at 1331.

n306 See id.

n307 See id.

n308 See id.

n309 See id.

n310 See id. at 1332.

n311 See id.

n312 See id.

n313 See id.

n314 See id.

n315 See id. at 1333. CyberGold operated a web site located at www.cybergold.com. The website provided information about CyberGold's upcoming service which included maintaining a mailing list of Internet users (no geographic restrictions on membership were mentioned). An Internet user who wanted to participate in the service would provide CyberGold with his or her particular areas of interest. CyberGold would then provide the user with a personal electronic mailbox and would forward to the user advertisements that match the users' interests. CyberGold would then charge advertisers for access to the Internet users on its mailing list. At the time of the suit, CyberGold's service was not yet in operation, but it was soliciting customers. Id. at 1330.

n316 Id. at 1333.

n317 Id.

n318 Id.

n319 See id. The court here is using the converse of the traditional "pull" model of web sites. See Mark Eckenwiler, Criminal Law and the Internet, Legal Times, Jan. 23, 1995, at S32. In that model, information passively resides on a web site until accessed by a user. Here, the Missouri court used the converse theory to demonstrate that CyberGold consciously transmitted information from its California server to Missouri 131 times. See id.

n320 See id.

n321 Id. at 1334.

n322 See id.

n323 No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Ramsey County District Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), aff'd, 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal granted, No. C6-97-89, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 829 (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997), aff'd by an equally divided court, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).

n324 Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 717.

n325 See id. On Ramp's site was located at http://www.vegas.com.

n326 See id.

n327 See id. A note on the web page also advised users to consult with local authorities regarding restrictions on offshore sports betting by telephone before registering with WagerNet. See Id.

n328 See id.

n329 See id.

n330 See id.

n331 Id. A Granite Gate agent did not request the caller's home state to confirm whether online gambling was in fact "legal" in that jurisdiction. See id.

n332 See id.

n333 See id.

n334 See id.

n335 See id.

n336 See id. at 717-18.

n337 See id. at 718.

n338 See id.

n339 See id. (citing Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Minn. 1985)). The five factors included: "(1) the quantity of the defendant's contacts; (2) the nature and quality of the defendant's contacts; (3) the connection between the cause of action and the defendant's contacts; (4) the state's interest in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the parties." Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (discussing the "fair play and substantial justice" factors).

n340 Id. at 721 (holding that the defendants "demonstrated a clear intent to solicit business from markets that included Minnesota" by advertising their service on the Internet and soliciting business from Minnesota residents).

n341 Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).

n342 Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333).

n343 See id. at 718-19.

n344 See id. at 719-20.

n345 See id. at 720.

n346 Id.

n347 See id.

n348 See id. at 720-21.

n349 See id. at 721.

n350 See id.

n351 See id.

n352 See id.

n353 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).

n354 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).

n355 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).

n356 Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).

n357 Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).

n358 Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 419.

n359 See id.

n360 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

n361 Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).

n362 Id. at 1334.

n363 Id. at 1330.

n364 Id. at 1329.

n365 See id. at 1331.

n366 See id. at 1332.

n367 Hanson v. Deckela, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

n368 Some courts placed strong emphasis on how many users from the forum in question accessed the defendant's web site. See id. at 1333 (finding Missouri users had accessed defendant's web site 131 times); see also State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding at least 248 Minnesota computers accessed defendant's web site during a two-week period and that computers in Minnesota were among the most frequent users of defendant's service). Other courts placed strong emphasis on the pervasiveness and durability of the medium. See Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D.Conn. 1996) (finding that once an Internet advertisement is posted, it can be accessed again and again by potential customers).

n369 See David L. Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutional Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 819, 844-52 (1997) (finding that the court should not have exercised jurisdiction in Inset and Maritz because the web sites were "passive").

n370 Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 720.

n371 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D.Conn. 1996) (finding advertisement could reach at least 10,000 users in Connecticut alone and that an Internet advertisements could be accessed over and over by potential customers); see also Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332 (finding that there were 12,000 Internet users alone in Missouri and that an Internet advertisement does not rely on any other forms of media for its effectiveness).

n372 Inset, 937 F. Supp at 164.

n373 Expert Pages v. Buckalew, 1997 WL 488011 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 6, 1997).

n374 See id. at *1.

n375 See id.

n376 See id.

n377 Id.

n378 See id.

n379 See id.

n380 See id.

n381 See id.

n382 See id. at *5.

n383 See id. at *2.

n384 Cader v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

n385 Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011 at *3.

n386 See id at *2. These seven factors for evaluating reasonableness included: "1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs; 2) the burden on the defendant; 3) conflicts of law between the forum and defendant's home jurisdiction; 4) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; 6) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and 7) the existence of an alternative forum." Id. (citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991)).

n387 Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011 at *3.

n388 See id. at *4.

n389 Id.

n390 See id.

n391 See id.

n392 Id. at *5.

n393 See id.

n394 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).

n395 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

n396 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp at 300.

n397 See id. at 299.

n398 See id. at 300-1.

n399 See id. at 301.

n400 See id. at 297-98.

n401 See id. at 299.

n402 See id.

n403 See id.

n404 See id. at 300.

n405 See id. at 299.

n406 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D.Pa. 1997).

n407 See id. Dot Com did not place any restrictions on who could register at the site.

n408 See id. at 1124.

n409 Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y 1997).

n410 See id. at *11. In that case the court held that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant who had placed a web site advertising law office infrastructure services using the domain name "ESQUIRE.COM" in violation of the plaintiff's trademark. The defendant resided in New Jersey and worked in Philadelphia. The defendant's service was not yet up and running at the time of the suit. The web site just advertised a soon-tobe-offered service. The court found that it could not exercise jurisdiction under any of the New York long-arm statutes which included transacting business in the state of New York. The court noted, "It appears that Hearst has placed itself in a "Catch 22" situation. If Hearst had waited until Goldberger contracted to sell his attorney support services to New Yorkers, long-arm jurisdiction likely would have been appropriate. . . . But if Hearst had waited, it would have been faced with laches-type defenses and possible greater harm to its ESQUIRE trademark." Id. (citation omitted).